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Abstract 
 
Drawing on a series of in-depth interviews and statistical analysis of policy reports and 
documents, this paper examines how African nation states interact with Internet 
governance at the international level. There is a dominant paradigm at work that values 
the multistakeholder approach and encourages dialogue and equal representation. 
While, in principle, this model has developed for the good of all participating countries, 
we illuminate tensions and incongruities experienced by African nation states. We use 
three analytical frames that focus on the way countries are measured and ranked as ICT 
ready - what we refer to as accumulating evaluative value, the forms of resistance that 
emerge in order to counter the universalising values of Internet governance, and the 
way spatial geographies of internet use and access are mapped out politically. We draw 
attention to a paradox of stakeholder participation arguing that African nations 
experience continual disempowerment and alienation in their compliance with 
international directives.  
 
Keywords: Internet governance, Africa, multistakeholder, audit, localism, urban/rural 
divide  
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Introduction 
 
Although the performance of Africa’s mobile networks over the past decade has 
been remarkable, the telecommunications sector in the rest of the world has also 
evolved rapidly. Many countries now regard broadband Internet as central to 
their long-term economic development strategies, and many companies realize 
that the use of ICT is the key to maintaining profitability. In Africa, however, the 
Internet is still in its infancy. In most countries, access is limited and slow. 
Where broadband is available, it is typically very expensive—far beyond the 
financial means of the majority of Africans. Ensuring that networks are capable 
of delivering broadband Internet access at affordable prices is the next major 
challenge on the horizon for policy (Williams, Mayer, & Minges, 2011, World 
Bank Report). 
 
The World Bank, quoted above, promotes a universally held belief in 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) as central to the future prosperity 
of every society. ICTs are presented here as one of the driving forces of social 
transformation and economic growth, connecting communities across the globe and 
delivering goods and services with ever greater speed and efficiency. In realising the 
potential benefits of ICTs, the governance structure at the international level has 
adopted a participatory, multistakeholder model that seats representatives from 
business, government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) around the table to 
form consensus about how the Internet should be run. This model and the entailed role 
of each stakeholder emerged from the 2005 World Summit on the Information Society 
(Hill, 2014) in order to assuage concerns about the United States’ cultural and economic 
dominance over the Internet. While the international governance structure promotes a 
dialogic model emphasising representativeness and fairness, the costs of ‘joining’ and 
sustaining membership should not be underestimated, particularly for African countries 
hoping to develop their economies through ICT investment. In this paper we examine 
what this multistakeholder model means for seven African countries, which are 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zimbabwe.   
The story of ICTs in Africa is about achieving sustainable economic growth and 
societal progress through the development and application of digital technologies. ICTs 
are positioned as a panacea to long-standing social problems and economic stagnation 
that have historically characterised African societies. Technological innovation in mobile 
telephony in particular is already seen to have increased the speed and efficiency of 
financial transactions and communications, decreasing wait times, bureaucracy and the 
propensity for corruption (James, 2009). While advances can be seen in some areas, 
overwhelmingly the story is still one of a continent playing catch up. The opening quote 
expresses a widely held view that African countries suffer from deficits in ICT provision, 
access and use compared to the rest of the world. Furthermore, this lag is considered 
representative of the low economic status of African countries on the global stage and 
has come to be encapsulated in the concept of the digital divide that separates the 
connected North from the disconnected South (Norris, 2001). 
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Academic and policy literature on the digital divide has predominantly focused 
on its causes (Fuchs and Horak, 2008; Norris, 2001; van Dijk and Hacker, 2003), the 
efficacy of intervention policies designed to decrease the gap (Gebremichael and 
Jackson, 2006; Kozma et al., 2004), and on patterns of state uptake of ICT provision 
(Strover, 2003). In this body of literature the digital divide is explained as a social fact 
with an emphasis on assessing various schemes and initiatives designed to close it. 
Limited attention is given to discussing the discursive influence of the concept of the 
digital divide in framing and configuring the role of ICTs in Africa. This extends to 
understanding and resolving in-country disparities between those that have access to 
ICTs and the mainly rural and urban poor that do not.  
In this paper, we examine how African nation states are represented and 
participate in international Internet and ICT governance. As stakeholders at the 
international level, African nation states are automatically disadvantaged because they 
are seen to occupy the negative side of the digital divide. This division emerges as a 
dominant discourse for marking out the limits of their participation.   
One necessity that concerns us is the centralisation of government offices to 
accommodate ICT.  Each of the African nation states we studied had in recent years 
consolidated its ICT services under a single ministerial banner and established a 
corresponding national regulatory body. It is centralisation at the national level that 
supports international deliberation, but it also means that despite pretensions to 
transcend national boundaries, Internet governance is ever more tightly bound to state 
power. Bekkers (in Boymal et al., 2007, p. 409) succinctly states that ‘politics and 
technology have power as their central focus, and large technological innovation at a 
societal level is deeply interwoven with politics in modern societies.’  International 
efforts have coalesced around the centralisation and subsequent harmonisation of ICT 
policies amongst participating states. In Africa, much of the promise of the Internet, in 
relation to bringing prosperity and promoting social development (Hargittai and Hsieh, 
2013; United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, 2014), is tied to the 
state’s ability to unite ICT under the remit of a single ministry.   
In our analysis, we draw upon a series of in depth interviews with ministers and 
ICT officials from the seven countries. We also include content analysis of over 50 policy 
documents and reports taken from International, pan African and national arenas to 
demonstrate statistical variability in word usage. Our findings reveal three interlinked 
problems that inhabit the unfolding narrative of ICT provision and access in African 
countries. First, there is the problem of achieving fair representation and being heard at 
the international level. Secondly, there are subtle effects related to interoperability, such 
as those associated with the impact of accounting practices and audit cultures, which 
remain unacknowledged in much of the policy literature. Thirdly, there is the question 
of just what the state has remit over in African societies and the extent to which national 
policy is able to reflect and respond to local needs.  
The structure of this paper is formed around the articulation of three 
interrelated framing devices that we use to address the problems outlined above. We 
introduce the first of these framing devices, which concerns the accumulation of what 
we refer to as ‘evaluative value’. This concept finds inspiration in the work of James 
Scott (1999), whose book Seeing Like a State explored the ways in which nation states 
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have used particular methodologies in order to visualize their citizenry and the kinds of 
large scale programmes they have commissioned to intervene in and improve societal 
conditions. For our purposes, ‘evaluative value’ encapsulates the standardising methods 
and means by which states seek to visualize and measure their ICT activities in order for 
them to have meaning at the international level.  
The second framing device concerns relations between the universalizing 
discourses of international fora and the conceptualisation of local need. The imperative 
to obtain evaluative value, to make ICT measurable, comparable and operable, 
consolidates what DeNardis (2014) has argued as a greater centralisation of Internet 
governance at the national level that promotes an outwards facing policy profile. We 
demonstrate how Internet governance is predicated on universalizing principles of 
need, access and beneficence that recapitulate development discourses. This creates a 
dichotomy for African states in which they are obliged to participate in international 
fora in the hopes of being seen as an equal player, however, they become subject to 
discourses that perpetuate global inequalities positioning them as either developing or 
underdeveloped. We identified resistance to these sorts of encounters that tend to 
augment state control over ICTs thus undermining the very ethos of the 
multistakeholder model of internet governance.  
Our final framing device builds on the previous two and focuses on spatial 
difference, and in particular on the distinction in ICT policy between the urban and the 
rural. In accumulating evaluative value, we found that African nation states deploy a 
blanket policy in which the distinction between urban and rural is made, but only in 
order to treat them as the same. The rural and urban are conceived as being on the same 
pathway to development with the urban slightly further along. We draw attention to the 
tendency in these countries to impose verisimilitude on radically different geographical, 
political and cultural domains.  
We conclude by commenting on the need for more empirical studies to illustrate 
the plight of African countries and societies in the inevitable march towards 
universalised digitisation.  
 
Methodology 
We set out to understand the current state of Internet governance in seven 
African countries. We identified three groups of countries based on the following 
interrelated criteria: the level of ICT advancement; the level of donor activity and 
collaborative partnerships in developing ICTs; and political culture and history. While 
we use these somewhat artificial criteria to group the countries, we recognise that it 
may not be representative of an ‘African’ experience of Internet governance. However, 
our goal is to highlight the range of experiences that many resource-strapped countries 
have in relation to this issue. These countries represent a broad range of historical and 
social contexts that impact on the way in which ICT policies are formulated and 
implemented. 
Sierra Leone and Liberia have struggled to ignite their economies in the shadow 
of civil war. As post-conflict countries, both have been the recipients of international aid 
and donor investment in nascent ICT infrastructure aimed at rebuilding each nation 
respectively. This is exemplified by Sierra Leone’s plans to build a technology park close 
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to its capital city, Freetown, in order to catalyse a self-generating technology industry. 
Ghana, Kenya and Uganda represent eastern and western regions in Africa, but all three 
consider their ICT sectors as advanced in comparison to other African countries as they 
host both educational training,  industrial start-ups as a result of high levels of donor 
activity and collaborative partnerships (particularly between universities). These 
countries reflect on their progress as paving the way across the continent towards new 
models of African innovation. Zimbabwe represents southern Africa, but its political 
history has put it at odds with international policy processes. Ethiopia in East Africa not 
only has a unique history of African independence, but also one of the lowest Internet 
penetration rates in the whole of Africa. The political cultures and histories of these two 
countries has meant that while they have retained ICT policy strategies independent of 
the West, they have struggled to embed a strong ICT sector. Consequently, we believe 
that these seven countries provide a useful starting point as a preliminary study in 
understanding the factors that underpin the implementation of Internet governance 
directives at the national level. 
We conducted in-depth interviews with Ministers and senior ICT officials in each 
of the seven countries listed above. A table of participants is listed below with the 
corresponding code used to identify them in the discussion1.   
 
Country Identifying 
code 
Most recent ICT policy 
Kenya K ICT 1 2014 
Ghana G ICT 1 2005 
Uganda U MP 1 2012 
Ethiopia E ICT 1 2009 
Zimbabwe Z MP 1 2005 
Liberia L MP 1 2009 
Sierra Leone SL MP 1 2005 
 
 
Using a mixed methods approach 
Secondary empirical data was collected using a mixed methods approach 
triangulating interview data with computer assisted text analysis to give a more 
complete understanding of how the three framing devices outlined above play out in the 
study. The content analysis uses an 800,000-word corpus from policy and policy-related 
documents compiled from international, regional, and national institutions (Rooney, 
                                                        
1 The research project met with the highest ethical standards. All participants were sent in 
advance an information sheet describing the research project and the researchers details, as well 
as an informed consent form, which they were required to sign and send back prior to interview. 
Interviews were digitally recorded and later transcribed. Data analysis involved using thematic 
induction coding, used mainly in grounded theory.  
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2005). The documents were analysed using Leximancer software. The software uses a 
machine learning optimisation approach that facilitates intercoder reliability as it 
produces the co-occurrence matrix. The software also allows users to inspect the ranked 
list of terms that comprise the word frequency to ensure that the meanings and usage 
are accurately interpreted. 
Documents were included in the corpus if they related directly to Internet 
governance directives or implementation. At the international level, documents were 
taken from key organisations such as the World Bank and Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations and ICANN.  Among these 
umbrella groups, documents from agencies that deal directly with Internet governance 
issues were included; most prominently, the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). These documents 
collectively construct a framework, some more directly than others, of how Internet 
governance should occur at the national level. Documents from the pan-African (or 
regional) level were drawn from collaborations between civil society groups and state-
civil society collaborations across the continent. This group does not produce new 
policies, per se, but are instrumental in finding or articulating mechanisms for the 
implementation of policy across Africa. Examples include the Africa Internet Governance 
Forum (AfIGF), the African Telecommunications Union (ATU), and Collaboration on 
International ICT Policy in East and Southern Africa (CIPESA). For national documents, 
ICT policies and directly supporting documents from the seven countries were included 
in the corpus. A master list of potential documents was generated through keyword 
searches regarding Internet governance in the search engine, Google.  The organisations 
associated with the documents were catalogued and then scrutinised to determine 
whether their self-descriptions qualified them as key actors in global Internet 
governance debates (Stein, 2009). The documents were scrutinised separately by both 
authors to ensure that they were relevant before including them in the corpus.  
Output from the content analysis was divided into two groups: concepts that 
were unique to each stakeholder group (unique terms) and concepts that were common 
across all three (shared terms).  The concepts that were shared across the groups were 
given rankings for each group as a measure of comparative weight given to each 
concept. The resulting three sets of rankings of the common terms were input into SPSS 
to derive a Spearman’s rank coefficient correlation. 2 
 
From centralisation to ‘evaluative value’ 
In the seven countries studied, we observed that in the last ten years each had 
invested in a dedicated ministry of ICT. Up until that point individual agencies oversaw 
various aspects of telecommunications, postal and courier services and so on. With the 
growing inevitability of digital technologies facilitated by the Internet, countries began 
to unify their services to acquire and enhance ICTs. This process was accompanied by 
                                                        
2 Spearman’s rank is an appropriate method because it complements the ranking output of the 
content analysis. Spearman is also ideal because rank correlation coefficients are less influenced 
by statistical anomalies (Barrow, 2009) and can help to assess the degree of complementarity 
among the three datasets (Jayawickrama and Thangavelu, 2010).  
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the creation of adjunct regulatory bodies responsible for delivering infrastructure and 
access.  
We set up this section to explore two contradictory findings that lead us to the 
development of the first framing device that is ‘evaluative value’. Using content analysis, 
we demonstrate how national policy mirrors international rhetoric and thus signifies 
that at least rhetorically, African nation states are in unison with policy articulated at the 
international level. Contrary to this statistical picture, participants narrate a deeply 
flawed relationship to international ICT governance that results from a series of deficits 
that include limited access to expertise, funding and institutional will.   
The table below shows the shared terms among the three groups of documents 
and their respective rankings. The output of the Spearman’s Rho test shows (table 1) 
that while some disparity exists across the three groups, all three variables are 
significant and positively correlated. Hence, the relatively low disparity would suggest 
that the nation-state is for the most part prioritising values more or less along the same 
lines as the international community.  
 
Table 1 Correlations 
 Country-
Level Group 
Pan-African 
Group 
Int’l Group 
Spearman's 
rho 
Country-Level Group 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000 .724
** .615** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 
N 33 33 33 
Pan-African Group 
Correlation 
Coefficient .724
** 1.000 .838** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 
N 33 33 33 
International Group 
Correlation 
Coefficient .615
** .838** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . 
N 33 33 33 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 2 Output from content analysis: list of shared terms, rank and relevance in 50 policy documents. 
 
 
The high correlation of the pan-African to the global group could be due to the 
consistently greater participation of pan-African representatives at international 
conferences and through formal and informal linkages.  For example, ICANN has 
representation at many high-level pan-African meetings. The pan-African group can be 
likened to ‘techno-elites’ (Castells, 2003, p. 39) in that they are constituted by a 
community of technologically competent members, who are acknowledged by their 
peers and often educated in the West. Moreover, our participants alluded to the traffic of 
people and knowledge between the national and the pan-African level, thereby 
highlighting the functional role of this intermediate body.  
The farthest groups apart, the country-level and the international level are still 
positively correlated. These findings counter the experiences of participants when they 
describe widening disparities between policy making at international and national 
levels. The creation of a single government ministry and attending regulatory body 
meant that ICT had a home in government, but moreover, it also promoted the 
representation of national interests at the international level (as demonstrated in the 
content analysis). According to the DeNardis (2014, p. 230), centralisation is presumed 
to be one of the more fruitful ways to ensure not only better representation, but also 
that the apt governing mechanisms are in place to respond to and implement 
international directives and protocols. She observes that ‘the presumption behind the 
enforcement of multistakeholderism is government centralisation because government 
has the necessary legitimacy to create the processes to foster and enforce 
multistakeholder approaches.’ Thus, the process of centralisation at the national level 
has enabled a synthesis of Internet governance at regional and international levels. In 
addition, centralisation appears to have lent a new legitimacy to countries in the Global 
South by increasing their visibility at international fora.  
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While the statistical analysis illustrates consistency in rhetoric, participants 
reflect on the practical demands of what they consider effective engagement in 
international fora. The Kenyan participant quoted below alludes to the limitations of the 
state, providing a pointed perspective on the question of participation and change 
management: 
  
I think that [participation at the international level] has been a big issue and the other 
issue will be change management. That has been slow, totally, well non-existent 
(laughter). This is a very big challenge: to convince management to allow participation at 
the international level. So we kind of miss out on what goes on internationally because 
we do not participate. 
 
When this participant was questioned further regarding the potential benefits of 
attending international conferences for ICT development, he remarked the following: 
 
Well, we would learn from best practices. We would learn from best practices elsewhere 
by interacting and meeting people at this forum. Then it totally changes the approach 
with which we deal with ICT as a sector. It not only changes how we prioritise such 
issues because we probably could be having resources but we are just not putting it to 
the right use or we are giving the wrong area priorities where we shouldn't be putting 
them. Because there is really nothing new that we are doing in the country that has not 
been done elsewhere. It will be of immense value to us if we learn from different 
experiences and to create a different framework so that some of these things can be 
implemented once we come back [home]. 
 
Most participants expressed concerns about a lack of access to meetings. While 
African governments aspire to be included in international discussions, and have 
centralised their governing structures accordingly, this participant laments the lack of 
will on behalf of the government to enable that participation. Other participants, Liberia 
for example, lamented the lack of available funds to attend international meetings and 
participate in the development of policy at that level. Participants allude to a causal 
relationship between deliberations occurring at the international level and the 
institutional capacities enabling national policy processes.  
According to participants, institutional capacities are manifest in the size and 
composition of delegations sent to important meetings such as the ITU meeting in 
Geneva, Switzerland. While new ICT ministries were created in order to operate as 
authoritative interlocutors for participating in international fora, many African states 
simply lack the human resource, expertise, diplomatic experience and finances to send 
effective delegations. From the perspective of the following participant, richer countries 
are more effective at the international level because they have greater resources.   
 
In the UK, if you are going to discuss the issue of Internet governance, you find it’s a team 
of around 30 [people] at an IT event. Two people concentrating on online protection, for 
children ... others are concentrating on cyber security, others are concentrating on social 
media so and so forth, now for Uganda one individual is sent to participate in all those 
processes, and you will find that the problem is not getting access but how effective we 
are when we get to those meetings. 
U MP 1 
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In comparison to Western states, African governments do not have access to the 
ecologies of expertise on various aspects of Internet governance. Consequently, African 
governments make limited contributions to the agendas and outcomes of international 
meetings. An additional concern is that the institutions and organisations that are 
formed in Africa to deal with Internet governance are inherited from predominantly 
Western models. This registers as a from institution building ‘know-how’ that is 
imported by African states. As Oyeyinka and Gehl Sampath (2011, p. 376) argue, African 
states continue to experience a classic problem in knowledge and policy transfer 
because the institutional models exported from the West ‘were products of an organic 
institutionally-building process, rather than mechanically given. The institutional forms 
were created, refined and adapted to given [Western] contexts over a long historical 
period’. What this means for African states is that their national institutions are not 
always adapted to African historical and social contexts, and consequently they continue 
to exhibit a misalignment between the development goals of the state and its 
institutional capacities to deliver.  
Another concern is that weak delegations lead to underrepresentation at the 
international level, with participants intimating a sense that the national voice is 
‘drowned out’:  
 
One challenge is poor representation and therefore, the voice is drowned out against 
other countries that are well represented.  
Z ICT 1 
 
When we go to these meetings we find the usual people, you know the usual suspects, 
you know some people from Senegal, some people from Nigeria ... I think that 
representation is … strong. You know, most of the time we are always drowned out by 
the other countries anyway. So I think the problem has to do with funding, how to get 
more people with a view to participate, basically for them to go. 
G ICT 1 
 
Populating meetings and conferences with representatives is presented here as 
a means to increasing the volume of the national voice. From the perspective of 
participants Internet governance emerges as territorial in the sense that the greater a 
country’s representation (in terms of physical presence), the greater their stake in 
discussions and their potential to influence policy (Turner, 2006, p. 420).  
In our analysis, centralising ICT governance sought to accomplish two objectives 
for improving ICTs in African nation states. First, as mentioned above it sought to 
enhance visibility for African countries by their being able to present a unified, symbolic 
and literal figurehead at international meetings. It also meant that the governing 
mechanisms were in place to respond to and accept international directives. While 
synthesis could now occur across nation states, centralisation has also positioned 
African countries within international benchmarking and ranking systems. Being 
counted in this way has had important implications for attracting donor funding as well 
as foreign direct investment for projects enabling ICT provision, such as the technology 
parks in Ghana and soon to be in Sierra Leone. While participants lamented that 
centralisation did not necessarily result in being heard at the international level, they 
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showed an astute awareness of the power of being counted and then ranked.  This is 
demonstrated by the Ghanaian participant, when he says:  
 
We are actually increasing the access and the penetration from time to time and clearly 
we feel that people have benefited from the technology in the country, but just to 
indicate also there is a United Nations measurement called the e-government index that 
we can look at ... and this year we have achieved a lot and we have been given the title of 
the most improved country in the developing nations … [our] ranking was 172 from the 
total of 190 nation member states but in the 2014 evaluation we have achieved 153. This 
is major achievement of around 15 points.  This is getting some positive development, 
but clearly we have to work hard and there is an enormous interest in this research.  
 
This participant articulates an evaluative process in which Ghana has leapt up 15 
points in an international league table measuring the relationship between e-
government and sustainable development (United Nations Department of Social and 
Economic Affairs, 2014). The methodology used to calculate this league table is not 
dissimilar to thousands of classificatory systems that set out each year to measure the 
world in its various dimensions (Bowker and Star, 2000). There are sets of indicators 
and reporting functions, information gateways, classifications and algorithmic equations 
that draw together a harmonised picture of what e-governance looks like and its success 
at improving universal benchmarks in poverty reduction, political participation and 
reduced corruption.  
Being included in the United Nations e-government survey serves as an example 
of what we refer to as evaluative value. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Scott 
(1999) and Power (1999), evaluative value can be understood as an accounting practice 
that generates comparative data, and by virtue of this promises greater visibility, 
representation and ultimately legitimacy in multistakeholder fora. Indeed, the 
measurable nation state is itself prerequisite condition to participation in the 
multistakeholder model. Using Power’s (1999) influential argument about the rise of 
audit society, we argue that the ability to measure ICT activities in both public and 
private spheres means that the state itself becomes a measurable object. In this way, the 
possibilities of governments to count ICT-related activities is in effect a means to 
accumulate a type of value that permits entry to and is taken seriously within regional 
and international arenas. It also means that fundamental changes have taken shape at 
the state level to render it measurable that include transparency protocols, 
administrative infrastructures and evaluative processes. This produces quantified 
knowledge that serves as a key diagnostic tool that identifies problems that beset 
African countries and informs the interventionist strategies aimed at resolving them.   
 As the participant from Ghana illustrates, in order to compete globally there is 
an imperative for African countries to establish their place in the ranking order and 
realise their worth in relation to others. As discussed in the next section, the 
accumulation of evaluative value is the adoption of standardising and harmonising 
processes that are underpinned by universalising principles.  
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Universalising principles and forms of resistance 
  The universalising principles we discuss in this section emerged from our data 
collection and are concerned with the articulation of norms of practice and behaviour 
that condition participation at the international level. They often embodied a moral 
force that compels African governments in particular to adopt more open and 
transparent modes of governance, to exhibit the will to participate and the aspiration to 
improve. As the Sierra Leonean participant demonstrates, the willingness of states to be 
counted and accountable to the universalising processes of the multistakeholder model 
itself becomes a behavioural expectation.     
Yes, we are always open. We are very concerned that we have to comply with 
international best practices. We have to be open about what we are doing. Therefore, 
there are so many different surveys; people come in and surveys. … We open our doors 
and talk to them. Sometimes three times per month. We are open. The surveys, the 
people range from everywhere. We are a member of the ITU, we are also a member of 
the Commonwealth Communications Organisation, etc.  And those organisations 
themselves usually (conduct) surveys with us. 
SL MP 1 
 
The paradox of accumulating evaluative value is alluded to in this quote. The 
participant describes complying with the systematic and institutionalised accounting 
processes of multilateral and international governance agencies that aim to quantify 
state activities. The benefits of compliance, it would seem, are recognition, 
representation and state autonomy. However, being continually surveyed also 
reinforces the geopolitical position of poorer African countries such as Sierra Leone. We 
argue that the accumulation of evaluative value creates a cyclical relationship that is 
constitutive of global power imbalances: countries are obliged to participate at the 
international level through knowledge systems, such as surveys, which aspire to give 
them a representative voice, but in actual fact become the evidence base for their 
apparent underdevelopment. For participants of this study, one way of breaking this 
cycle is to resist the universalising call of international directives.  
Nash (2013) shows that the guiding principles in the Declaration of Freedom 
developed at the 2003 UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) serve to 
establish the Internet as a domain free from the rule of states and monopoly of 
corporations. The Declaration, and its enveloping values, underpin the multistakeholder 
model. It was agreed upon by governments, businesses and civil society organisations in 
an effort to create a universal vision of the Internet’s function in any given society.  
By implication, African nation states are compelled to respond to international 
political discourse that operates within the politico-administrative logic of the West and 
is underpinned by a set of liberal and universalising values, such as those exemplified in 
the Declaration. This means that at the international level, the policy process moves 
along the historical grooves cut by development programs and initiatives, which are 
well documented and critiqued, and include the laissez-faire economic optimism of 
structural adjustment programmes and the democratic impulses of good governance 
projects. These development histories are culturally specific, and they affect the way 
Internet governance takes shape. The oft-mentioned ‘digital divide’ is an expression of 
this historical trajectory. It represents more than a gap in access to ICTs, it is 
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symptomatic of gaps between rich and poor, developed and developing, knowledge-
based societies and agrarian communities (Graham, 2011). Living with the knowledge of 
having deficits obliges African governments to show the will to participate and to 
improve by complying with universal policies that seek to close these gaps (in Li, 2007).  
In response to the contradictions inherent in the multistakeholder model and 
the paradox of evaluative value, forms of resistance were manifest in several strategies 
found in the interview data and content analysis: the exercise of monopolistic power 
over telecommunications in Ethiopia; the insistence of employing home-grown talent in 
the ICT sector in Uganda and Sierra Leone; and the development of local content3 which 
all participants discussed. As the following participant explains, the Ethiopian 
government’s monopoly of its telecommunications industry is a way to resist the 
international community’s attempts to impose market liberalisation.  
 
We are focused on what is an advantage to our national interest. So based on that we will 
find a way to change, manage or adjust the policy issues (as appropriate).  We are not 
actually driven to implement something from the “top” or from international 
perspective. I can actually give you many examples so that you can see the “moral” 
position.  We have a number of international donors who are pushing us, but we want to 
fix the national infrastructure first before we go to the market liberalisation model. We 
need to wait and even though they are actually forcing us, pushing us …. our government 
is not actually willing to do so because … our objective is to actually meet the national 
demand … I want to specify that our telecomm is not open to externals, even Ethiopians 
cannot invest in telecomm as an operator. It is totally as a monopoly at this point in time. 
 
The ‘moral position’ that this participant refers to is the responsibility to serve national 
interests and needs over and above compliance at the international level. He argues that 
the exercise of monopolistic power is the only way to serve this purpose at the moment. 
By implication, Ethiopia’s national interests and needs would be eclipsed by the 
deregulation of its telecommunications market. 
While Ethiopia maintains a strong hold over its telecommunications industry, 
other countries are staking out national autonomy through labour. This involves 
nurturing a labour force of technicians, engineers and scientists to create new 
applications and advance technology, as well as the administrative support capable of 
consulting at different scales, national and international, and on a wide range of 
projects. As the following Sierra Leonean participant explains, a challenge African 
countries face is employing their own people to develop and deliver ICT projects:   
 
When we are working with UK organisations or American organisations or any 
international organisation, they have to supply their own consultants. For instance, this 
project will cost $100M USD and at the end of day, 70%-80% of that money goes back to 
them, in terms of ICT consultant expenses and so on. We believe that it is local 
consultants that should be used and save that money to pay on the project. As a matter of 
fact, local consultants cost far far less than international consultants. But the 
organisations will insist that they want their own consultants to work on the project and 
our local people will just work with them. At the end of the day, we found that the local 
                                                        
3 Local content refers to two specific types of content: local content generated in-country, and 
local language content that is specific to ethnicities within country. While these two types of 
content are distinct we group them under the label of local content in this paper.  
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people do all of the job and the international consultants take all of the money. So that is 
the big challenge. 
 
As this participant points out, internationally funded projects tend to use their own 
consultants instead of tapping into a pool of home-grown talent. A consequence of this, 
which the participant underscores, is the perpetuation of global political and economic 
imbalances. This participant went onto to discuss in detail the fact that a French 
consulting firm is currently underwriting the Sierra Leonean National 
Telecommunications Act of Parliament (van Klyton and Liyanage, 2015). International 
investments in ICT facilitate the flow of capital back to the West and do very little for 
building up human resources, skills and capacity in country. In response to these sorts 
of arrangements, a key imperative is for countries like Sierra Leone to quickly build up a 
critical mass of expertise and skilled labour that can then be employed to deliver and 
advise on ICTs, a sentiment echoed across participants in this study. 
 
We believe that the [critical mass of knowledge] will give our country what we need for 
the development that we are undertaking in ICT. Of course, the internet governance and 
other projects that we have will be faster and done efficiently if we have a 'depository' of 
professional ICT people...If we want to fast track the process, we need to have our own 
home-grown technicians and programmers, etc. that will move the process of ICT in the 
country.  
SL ICT 1 
 
By expanding the national pool of skilled and consultative labour, African countries also 
envisage an increase in local language content and even greater representation of 
national interests and needs. Language content and skilled labour are considered by 
participants to be synergistic and are perceived to contribute toward social and 
economic development, and in particular improvements in literacy levels, educational 
attainment and political participation. This process would then strengthen the 
capacities of social institutions, such as universities and libraries, to innovate. As the 
Ghanaian participant explains:  
 
The NGOs and all of those organisations are responsible for helping to relate that kind of 
growth that we need to pull people up for content. Because what is the use of creating an 
internet all the way to the rural areas, districts and villages and all they do is pull of 
content from America and from Europe.  We have to build our own (Internet) content in 
Ghana so that we can stay on our bandwidth and we can use the internet for interesting 
things in Africa. 
 
The need for local content, as expressed here, is vital to generating an autonomous, 
culturally specific voice. Local content is described as leading towards economic 
independence by creating demand for national ICT products and services. Similarly, the 
Ugandan participant linked the generation of local content to social development, and 
thus accumulating the sort of evaluative value discussed earlier.  
 
By all means it should have local content and also in indigenous languages to ensure that 
there is an increase in the use of the Internet. Because if you look at India which has a 
good ICT index according to the UN much of the content is in local languages. The 
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content that you will find online is in their local language. So we are also concerned 
about development, we need ICT and the Internet to develop. It is important ... that those 
ones  [who don’t read or write in English] should be kept at the core and develop content 
that is appropriate to them so this is what we push especially if we are an agricultural 
country. We are pushing our research and agricultural farming methods and so on and 
localise it so that the farmers can use the Internet as a development tool. So that they can 
get information in the local languages. 
  
The Ethiopian participant also forged a link between local content and development as 
demonstrative of good citizenry: 
 
Clearly we are now increasing the capacity towards making technology available to 
citizens and as time is going we do actually exercise citizens … using technology for day-
to-day activity. And we are actually saying that ICT is important for the national 
development plan.  And clearly it is feasible to the citizens to make their life easier and 
giving pride in their people by and through communications and internet exchange and 
so on. 
 
 Citizens can give ‘pride to their people’ by engaging with ICTs and learning to 
communicate online in their own languages, using their own symbols and signification 
systems, to connect across cultural divides and promote local businesses and services. 
While local content is conceptualised as a common good that delivers a number of social 
benefits, calibrating its effectiveness and use in society is difficult (Grazzi and Vergara, 
2012). Only one participant reported a state-led initiative for identifying and classifying 
local and foreign content and measuring the ratio between them.  
 
Right now, what we are doing. We have enacted a Local Content Policy, but we still 
know the constraints that we have, we do not really have as much local content that we 
want. So we have put in place measures, we are looking at three years from now. By 
2017/2018, we are looking to enforce the 60/40 local content policy; So whatever we 
are doing 60% has to be local content and 40% foreign. But because we cannot provide 
60% of local content at the moment, we are open to 60% international content. But soon, 
we would like to have 60% local content and 40% international content. 
SL ICT 1  
 
Sierra Leone have devised a ‘Local Content Policy’ in which a threshold of 60% local 
content is considered sufficient to support social development and economic 
independence. However, at present, Sierra Leone is not in a position to enforce this 
threshold, but through its Cadre4 programme of nurturing young talent, it aims to be 
ready in three years. 
While the aspirations of local content development for internet might be valiant, 
several real challenges prevent an easy implementation. Salawu (2010) discusses six 
challenges to local content development in an African context that range from 
codification, funding, the acquisition of materials in indigenous languages to the 
technology required to digitise records. In addition, there is also the challenge of 
addressing the ‘local norms and values’ in the use of the technology. 
                                                        
4 Cadre is …. 
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To reflect participants’ emphasis on local content, we would expect to find 
expressions of local needs and interests prioritised in policy documents. However, in the 
content analysis that we conducted such corresponding sentiments and ideas were 
missing.  
 
Table 3 
 
 
Table 3 shows the most frequently occurring terms that are unique to each 
stakeholder group; that is, terms that are not shared by the other groups. The 
international group has the longest list, no doubt because the documents in this group 
tended to be larger and more plentiful. In the language of international policy 
development there are a number of universalizing principles that relate to partnerships, 
global, open, world and so on that endorse the multistakeholder approach.  However, 
DeNardis (2014, p. 227) argues that multistakeholderism should not be viewed as ‘a 
value in itself applied universally but as a question of what form of administration is 
necessary in any particular context’.  Hence, a different set of keywords emerge at the 
local level, computer, equipment, software, and requirements. In the content analysis, 
policy documents appear to show nation-states working on the administrative 
capacities to respond to multistakeholderism rather than echoing the rhetoric of doing 
so. At the local level, content analysis illustrates that word frequency leans towards 
delivery and provision while concepts related to language and culture, connected 
communities, case studies and examples are absent.  
Contrary to the content analysis, participants discursively constructed local 
needs, interests and difference as synonymous with national identity. As such, the ever 
globalising trends of the Internet posed a distinct threat to the preservation of local 
cultures and by virtue of this, ideas of nationhood (Mueller, 2010). According to one 
participant it is the duty of the state to protect its national interests by prescribing 
policy and legislation designed to monitor, control and promote certain types of internet 
access and content. This is a form of resistance that would appear, from the interview 
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data at least, to reassert state control in a way that defies the very foundations of the 
multistakeholder model.  
 
There are issues that we think should be on the agenda that should be debated or 
discussed, issues of the insecurity that social networks bring. We are getting a bit 
worried about their negative influence on society, and in particular the controlling board 
of ICANN is controlled by significant interests, that is code for the global tech [industry]. 
Z MP 1 
 
In this quotation, the Zimbabwean participant states that he is concerned that 
national culture is at risk of being eroded by unbridled Internet access. Collins (2010) 
supports this assumption by arguing that globalisation of media and technology, such as 
ICT, threatens social cohesion, which can be a destabilising factor in developing and 
developed nations alike. The right to a national identity, underpinned by distinct sets of 
cultural norms and practices and the accompanying symbolic systems, is reconfigured to 
accommodate the Internet. Nationhood is conceived as an imagined online community 
(Anderson, 1991). However, bringing about a unity between the Internet and 
nationhood is also the cause of consternation because it unleashes an unresolved 
tension at the international level. The nation state is weakened through the advances of 
new technologies and universalising principles of freedom of access (Mueller, 2010), 
and yet at the same time it is reenacted as the most powerful vehicle of ICT governance 
and delivery (Shirazi et al., 2010). The same participant goes on to vent frustration at 
some of the consequences of this unresolved tension concerning the extension of state 
power over Internet content.  
 
We are also concerned about the fact that not much truth is coming out, particularly to 
African Countries with regards to the threat of the Internet. They talk about the fact that 
there shouldn't be less of an Internet in the Western world, which they talk a lot about, 
and yet, if it so happens they can pull down social networks. I remember when there was 
a disturbance [London riots], the Prime Minister came out very strong about what he 
thought was the cause of the disturbance, he cited social networks and their threats to 
civility ... but then there are these double standards, when the Muslim world talks very 
loud about the negative impacts of social networks, at the same time [the international 
community] says that we shouldn't interfere, then we have double standards.  
Z MP 1 
 
In the scenario described by this participant, Internet use becomes an outlet for 
good, responsible citizenry. However, from the perspective of the international 
community the kind of control that this participant is referring to, that is the state’s 
ability to block or filter content, could be seen as an attempt to ‘recreate the kind of 
control they once had over traditional territorial media’ (Mueller, 2010, p. 197). 
Attempts at forging this kind of control evoke painful memories of war and dictatorship 
that plagued African nation states in the decades after independence.  
The frustration felt by participants stems from the apparent double standard 
exercised by the international community and might account for the disparity between 
interview data and content analysis. Participants point to the dynamics of a discrete 
power structure of Internet governance that exacerbates the geo-political conflict 
between the North and the South, and also draws attention to the myth that binds them 
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to each other, multistakeholderism. Mueller (2010, p. 265) argues that the process of 
multistakeholderism, as a cipher for global equality, is plagued by ‘plasticity and 
imprecision’. He further notes that the power and rights of a stakeholder are not clearly 
defined and if ‘not properly institutionalised’, this framework can reinforce already 
existing imbalances, giving powerful actors more authority over the ‘categories of 
representation.’  
The local needs that participants refer to are wrapped up in a discourse of 
national identity that operates in symbiosis with international policy. This relationship 
is co-productive (Jasanoff, 2006) and embodies the actual uncertainty that surrounds 
the role of African nation states in Internet governance and their influence as 
stakeholders. Participants are presenting local need as a form of resistance, when in 
actuality they are engaged in the politics of representation referred to by Mueller 
(2010). Paradoxically, the national identity that is reasserted in the international 
community of Internet governance could well fundamentally undermine the guiding 
principles of that community.  
 
The Rural/Urban Divide 
While the problem of the state and its stakeholder role continues to vex African 
countries, we noticed that an understanding of what constitutes spatial and cultural 
difference was absent from both sets of data. By this, we mean that while rural and 
urban areas are defined as distinct they are placed on the same scale of development. In 
this section, we illustrate how the rural/urban divide is given verisimilitude. However, 
our concerns turn on how to account for the material conditions that produce the 
urban/rural divide, and which mean that they do not share verisimilitude and indeed 
may never exist on the same scales of development and perhaps neither should they. 
This lack of distinction is an effect of centralised policy processes required to achieve 
stakeholder status. States cannot appear to house discord, disunity and incongruity that 
would jeopardise the harmonisation of a unified policy discourse.  
Nowhere is this absence of an understanding of spatial difference more stark 
than in the blanket policies developed to provide ICT in rural and urban areas. The 
Kenyan ‘Pasha centres’ meaning ‘to inform’ in Swahili and the telecommunications 
centres of Zimbabwe are testimony to huge investment streams taking shape to bring 
ICT to rural communities.  
Rural development featured as a key theme emerging from the interview data. 
All of the participants stated that there is one ICT policy and not parallel policies for 
rural and urban development. For example, the Ethiopian and Ghanaian participants 
elaborated on their uniform ICT policies, which are focussed on provision.  
 
It is the same policy nationwide but we do actually work very hard in reaching the rural 
areas. For example we do have a connectivity issue which is rural connectivity issue … 
we are very proud to actually put around 15,000 points of access all over the country 
without actually discriminating in the locations within 5 km distance.  
E ICT 1 
 
One policy for all.  Like basically for those who want to move, you know, that is why we 
give [network] licenses. Once you have connectivity in a city, maybe 300 km from Accra, 
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it does not really matter. So long as you have the same kind of bandwidth and same kind 
of electricity… so we give people the incentive to move to the rural areas, in that case we 
can create a rural area migration.  So basically we give tax breaks to the people who 
want to create and these kinds of IT industries in the rural areas. So shortly we are going 
to see a migration, you know, in those areas. Once the policies have been implemented.  
G ICT 1 
 
Both sets of policies described here contain strategies that have been 
implemented in order to address the rural/urban divide. In Ethiopia, access points have 
been constructed every five kilometres, which as this participant further explained 
enabled hospitals and schools in remote areas to get online access. The Ghanaian 
participant described the kind of tax breaks and incentives on offer for rural ICT 
ventures in the hopes of ‘creating rural migration’ from urban centres. This participant 
implies that there is a geographical direction to ICT development emanating from the 
city outwards, and thus the city serves as a precursor to growth in the rural 
communities.  
According to Kyem (2012, p. 231) advancements in ICT technology have meant 
that rural areas have developed ‘new virtual relationships with urban centres that are 
uninhibited by conventional notions of distance and communication’. Kyem argues that 
the digital divide is shrinking and that rural and the urban are now connected through 
networks of knowledge and information in addition to physical infrastructure. Under 
the apparatus of centralised policy the rural has received renewed attention on its role 
in national economic growth and social development. The rural becomes a focal point 
once again as pathways to development through ICT are opened up to remote, agrarian 
communities. The impetus to include the rural in development strategies, and to renew 
it, is demonstrated in the testimonies of participants. Their comments echo Graham 
(2011, p. 215) who states that ICT can be seen as a means to move ‘people and places 
temporally along a pre-defined path to development.’ 
In the following quotation, the Ethiopian participant reflects on this drive to 
standardise and scale the use of the Internet in both rural and urban areas.  
 
In terms of internet penetration it is very low, nationally. But access which is already 
existing which is no bigger than two or 3% of the total population is located in bigger 
cities not only in Addis [Ababa] but there are some major cities that we call original 
cities, at least 4 or 5. And the Internet is actually very popular and we do have also many 
people participating in social networks and so on and clearly in the urban areas the 
Internet is more popular and people are using it for day-to-day activity. Clearly we have 
to work to improve or do the opposite in rural areas. 
E ICT 1 
 
This participant points to levels of connectivity being considerably lower in rural 
areas when compared to urban centres. An objective that he outlines is to even out and 
possibly reverse this trend.  
While harmonisation is one of the key objectives of centralised policy and 
regulation, several reasons emerged in the data that cast doubt on the congruity of rural 
and urban contexts. First we show how a saturation of information shapes urban 
experience in ways that are materially distinct from rural living. Secondly, the activities 
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of the private sector need to be considered and understood. Finally, mobile technologies 
are outpacing institutional efforts to unify ICT activities across countries.  
According to Rao (2005, p. 364), the use of information is one factor that may 
distinguish urban from rural living. He argues that the city holds a greater saturation of 
connectivity and information access that gives urban dwellers advantages over rural 
communities, which ‘may be exploited by the unscrupulous because of information that 
urbanites may be privy to while others may not.’  In his view, urban populations are 
often more privileged through greater concentrations of economic activity, education 
and so on, and this may perpetuate the divide despite the efforts of African governments 
to reverse migration from cities to rural areas and increase connectivity.  
The response from Kenya shows another factor that contributes to the 
distinction between rural and urban living. This concerns the distribution of private 
sector interest and investment.  
 
Actually in the developed, urban centres, and there are various levels of development 
like in Nairobi, we don't have this community centre because almost everywhere is 
connected. We have this community centre in the rural area because we want to set up 
connectivity where  the connectivity is actually really good and people will want to come 
and get information there.  The communication companies cannot come to set up 
connectivity everywhere where it does not make sense economically. So the government 
decided to set up this community centres so that we can be able to reach or get 
information to the most affordable level possible. 
 
In this quotation, the participant attributes the persistence of the urban/rural 
divide to the strategies of the private sector.  Companies are simply not willing to set up 
services in these areas because the associated high costs make it unattractive. This 
complaint was echoed in the testimonies of three participants (Uganda, Ghana, and 
Ethiopia).  Hence, states have had to intervene where market forces have proved 
unhelpful in this regard. Mobile technologies generated from within the private sector 
have been much discussed with regards to their impact on economic development 
(James, 2014), potentially outstrip institutional approaches to social and economic 
development. In interviews, mobile technologies were mentioned insofar as they 
reduced the need for rural ICT services in the form of the initiatives akin to the Kenyan 
‘Pasha centres’, whereby a room or office is fitted with a computer and online access. As 
the quotation below makes clear, in Uganda the proliferation of rural services was 
abandoned in the light of increased usage of mobile technologies. 
 
In Uganda, in the past, we have [had] what you call multipurpose telecommunication 
centres. In the[se] centres, … the purpose was for people to go and use the Internet. 
What we found was that anybody who can walk to an Internet cafe to use the Internet 
can access the most affordable platform. Their mobile phones are so very cheap you can 
buy a data band or something like that for £1 … so the people who are frequenting the 
Internet centres can in essence use the Internet with their mobile phones. Shifts in 
technology for mobile phones … have made the Internet centres redundant. 
 
As the Ugandan participant explains, mobile technologies such as smartphones and 
tablets are considerably cheaper and more efficient than setting up and maintaining 
rural service centres.  
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In this section, we have elaborated on the accumulation of evaluative value has 
implications for the spatialisation and indeed the geographical dimensions of ICT policy 
making. Reintroducing a geographical understanding of the uneven terrain of ICT use 
and provision (Graham et al., 2014) and, we argue, undermines a single national policy 
that complies with international directives. It is this critique that forms our third 
framing device. ICTs present ways in which to renew interest in rural development 
away from the expanding urban centres by narrowing virtual distances, while at the 
same time uniting policy under a centralised doctrine. An effect of this is that the urban 
and the rural are measured along the same scales of development. What constitutes 
their differences and the geographical distribution of state apparatus in each locale is 
absent from the data we collected.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have drawn on content analysis and interview data to illustrate 
how Internet governance finds articulation and is practiced in seven African countries. 
The experience of these countries illustrates how inseparable national policymaking is 
from the political deliberations happening at the international level. The international 
level depends on state participation, forming what DeNardis (2014), Hill (2014) and 
others have argued is a multistakeholder model that involves states, private sector and 
NGOs engaging in consensus building through dialogue. African governments have 
achieved stakeholder status by making significant changes to the institutional structure 
of national governance.  This has included, most prominently, centralising the governing 
mechanisms for ICT under a single ministerial office and establishing an attending 
regulatory body. While centralisation has increased the visibility of African countries, 
we developed three analytical frames that interrogate the paradoxical relationship 
between African states and international governance. 
Centralisation has enabled governments to measure and account for their ICT 
activities, needs and usage. We argued that this process leads to the accumulation of 
evaluative value, whereby the ability to be measured is a value in itself that promises 
greater representation and access to resources. Being measurable and ranked 
internationally enables countries to understand and visualise their worth (and in that, 
problems and deficits inherent to the country), and make appeals to receive investment 
and aid on that basis. We illustrate how the ranking of African countries also serves to 
reinforce their comparatively weaker position within the multistakeholder model. 
Consequently, compliance at the international level, in the form of the adoption of 
policies and institutional change, translates into continued unequal representation and 
the perpetuation of global inequalities. For participants, this paradox results in many 
issues prescient in African societies being overlooked or underrepresented at the 
international level. The content analysis illustrated synthesis between national, 
international and pan-African policy rhetoric, but in practice, effective engagement was 
described by participants as much more difficult to attain and sustain. We identified 
forms of resistance in which ideas of local needs and content, and monopolistic control 
were presented as ways for the state to act as custodian of its people, restoring national 
identity, autonomy and pride. In this way, attempts to counter the hegemonic currents 
of international ICT governance, and resist the paradox of participation, were inevitably 
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rooted in the reinstatement of state control, thus defying the ethos of Internet 
governance.  
This ambiguous role of African states led to our final framing device concerned 
with the spatialisation of internet governance. In all the countries we looked at, the 
rural/urban divide is attended to through a unified policy which placed them on a single 
development track heading towards full connectivity and access. This unified vision is 
the product of centralised policy making. We argued that it displaces the social and 
cultural specificity of each context, and leaves aside the question as to whether rural and 
urban communities should be treated the same at all.  
For African states, participation in the multistakeholder model of Internet 
governance entails costs that remain unaccounted for in academic debate. The moral 
calling of participation is levied by a universalising political rationality. Fulfilling 
multistakeholder status requires that the nation state exercises degrees of reflexivity 
and a show of the will to improve. It also requires an alignment of national ICT policy 
objectives with international internet governance directives. The costs of these aspects 
of participation add up to a reformatting of state power in Africa based on the 
assumption that the state is the best vehicle for implementing policy. There are question 
marks over the reach and indeed economic role of state power in African societies, 
especially in providing infrastructure and services to rapidly expanding urban areas in 
cities such as Nairobi, Freetown and Accra. For the African countries studied, 
participation in Internet governance represents an instantiation of historical global 
inequities, while paradoxically promising fairer, more just and equal representation and 
influence. The case laid out here reveals the need to reflect on and rethink the 
multistakeholder model.  
 
Word Count: 10,517
24 
 
Bibliography 
 
Anderson, B., 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism, 2nd Revised edition edition. ed. Verso Books, London ; 
New York. 
Barrow, M., 2009. Statistics for Economics, Accounting and Business Studies, 5th 
ed. Prentice Hall, Harlow, England, London ; New York. 
Bowker, G.C., Star, S.L., 2000. Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its 
Consequences. MIT Press, Boston, MA. 
Boymal, J., Martin, B., Lam, D., 2007. The political economy of Internet innovation 
policy in Vietnam. Technology in Society 29, 407–421. 
doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2007.08.003 
Castells, M., 2003. The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and 
Society, Reprint edition. ed. OUP Oxford, Oxford. 
Collins, R., 2010. Three Myths of Internet Governance: Making Sense of 
Networks, Governance and Regulation. Intellect, Bristol, UK; Chicago. 
Denardis, L., 2014. The Global War for Internet Governance. Yale University 
Press, New Haven. 
Fuchs, C., Horak, E., 2008. Africa and the digital divide. Telematics and 
Informatics 25, 99–116. doi:10.1016/j.tele.2006.06.004 
Gebremichael, M.D., Jackson, J.W., 2006. Bridging the gap in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
A holistic look at information poverty and the region’s digital divide. 
Government Information Quarterly 23, 267–280. 
doi:10.1016/j.giq.2006.02.011 
Graham, M., 2011. Time machines and virtual portals The spatialities of the 
digital divide. Progress in Development Studies 11, 211–227. 
doi:10.1177/146499341001100303 
Graham, M., Hogan, B., Straumann, R.K., Medhat, A., 2014. Uneven Geographies of 
User-Generated Information: Patterns of Increasing Informational 
Poverty (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 2382617). Social Science Research 
Network, Rochester, NY. 
Grazzi, M., Vergara, S., 2012. ICT in developing countries: Are language barriers 
relevant? Evidence from Paraguay. Information Economics and Policy 24, 
161–171. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2011.11.001 
Hargittai, E., Hsieh, Y.P., 2013. Digital Inequality, in: The Oxford Handbook of 
Internet Studies, Oxford Handbooks. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 
pp. 129–150. 
Hill, R., 2014. The Internet, its governance, and the multi-stakeholder model. info 
16, 16–46. doi:10.1108/info-05-2013-0031 
James, J., 2014. Product use and welfare: The case of mobile phones in Africa. 
Telematics and Informatics 31, 356–363. doi:10.1016/j.tele.2013.08.007 
James, J., 2009. Leapfrogging in mobile telephony: A measure for comparing 
country performance. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 76, 
991–998. doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2008.09.002 
Jasanoff, S., 2006. States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and the 
Social Order, New edition edition. ed. Routledge, London. 
25 
 
Jayawickrama, A., Thangavelu, S.M., 2010. Trade linkages between China, India 
and Singapore: Changing comparative advantage of industrial products. 
Journal of Economic Studies 37, 248–266. 
doi:10.1108/01443581011061267 
Kozma, R., McGhee, R., Quellmalz, E., Zalles, D., 2004. Closing the digital divide: 
evaluation of the World Links program. International Journal of 
Educational Development 24, 361–381. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2003.11.014 
Kyem, P.A.K., 2012. Is ICT the panacea to sub-Saharan Africa’s development 
problems? Rethinking Africa’s contentious engagement with the global 
information society. Progress in Development Studies 12, 231–244. 
doi:10.1177/146499341101200309 
Li, T.M., 2007. The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the 
Practice of Politics. Duke University Press, Durham. 
Mueller, M., 2010. Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet 
Governance, Reprint edition. ed. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Nash, V., 2013. Analysing Freedom of Expression Online: Theoretical, Empirical, 
and Normative Contributions, in: Dutton, W.H. (Ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Internet Studies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 
441–463. 
Norris, P., 2001. Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the 
Internet Worldwide. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York. 
Oyeyinka, B., Padmashree, G.S., 2011. Institutional Capacity and Policy Choices 
for Latecomer Technology Development, in: Noman, A., Botchwey, K., 
Stein, H., Stiglitz, J.E. (Eds.), Good Growth and Governance in Africa 
Rethinking Development Strategies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Power, M., 1999. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, New Ed edition. ed. 
OUP Oxford, Oxford; New York. 
Rao, S.S., 2005. Bridging digital divide: Efforts in India. Telematics and 
Informatics, WSIS Special Issue The World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) from an Asian-Pacific Region Perspective 22, 361–375. 
doi:10.1016/j.tele.2005.01.007 
Rooney, D., 2005. Knowledge, economy, technology and society: The politics of 
discourse. Telematics and Informatics, WSIS Special IssueThe World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) from an Asian-Pacific Region 
Perspective 22, 405–422. doi:10.1016/j.tele.2004.11.007 
Salawu, B.A., 2010. Issues and challenges in the creation of institutional 
repositories with local content : critical reflections. Information, society 
and justice journal 3, 59–68. 
Scott, J., 1999. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed, New edition edition. ed. Yale University Press, New 
Haven. 
Shirazi, F., Ngwenyama, O., Morawczynski, O., 2010. ICT expansion and the digital 
divide in democratic freedoms: An analysis of the impact of ICT 
expansion, education and ICT filtering on democracy. Telematics and 
Informatics 27, 21–31. doi:10.1016/j.tele.2009.05.001 
26 
 
Stein, L., 2009. Social movement web use in theory and practice: a content 
analysis of US movement websites. New Media Society 11, 749–771. 
doi:10.1177/1461444809105350 
Strover, S., 2003. Remapping the Digital Divide. The Information Society 19, 275–
277. doi:10.1080/01972240309481 
Turner, S., 2006. The Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Organisational Studies, 
in: Clegg, S.R., Hardy, C., Lawrence, T., Nord, W. (Eds.), The Sage Handbook 
of Organisation Studies. SAGE Publications, London, United Kingdom, pp. 
409–424. 
United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, 2014. E-Government 
for Future we Want, E-Government Survey. United Nations, New York. 
van Dijk, J., Hacker, K., 2003. The Digital Divide as a Complex and Dynamic 
Phenomenon. The Information Society 19, 315–326. 
doi:10.1080/01972240309487 
van Klyton, A., Liyanage, L., 2015. Chinese investment in the Sierra Leone 
telecommunications industry: an affront to the West?, in: China and 
Africa: Cooperation and Conflict. Routledge, London, United Kingdom. 
 
 
